On Degradation.

THIS is an important matter to consider and I will write of it now while I still feel I can. It occurs to me often, and doubtless occurs to others also, that pantheism is an unlikely postulate because God appears to suffer from degradation. If God exists and God is the universe why do we see evildoers on earth, such as murderers, why do termite infestations occur, why do we see corruption, both moral and physical, all around us? Why does cancer exist? Why does death exist? Why is so much of experience painful? Why must all the efforts and works of man crumble? Why is all our laboured persistence brought to nothing in time? Why does entropy (or death as some will have it) occur?

   It seems difficult that the perfect notion of God (that is the supposition of the perfect notion which is God, not that ours is a perfect notion) can ever be made compatible with cannibalism and the black death. Perhaps indeed it is more rational (paradoxical though it seem) to believe that all this mortality we dwell on in our thoughts, all humanity, all love, all happiness, all faith, all experience such as we know, is accidental and therefore unimportant, a rather peculiar little firework in Chaos. Then evil such as we consider it, degradation such as we hold it, is not remarkable or exceptional—only goodness is, only life, only creativity, only faith. More blandly this is called the problem of evil. It is quite right that atheists or logicians call this a problem for the theist (at least for one who holds the notion that God is good because perfect and perfect because good (a just leap of reason, after all, the word for God in English is simply one vowel short of the word 'good'.)) This is no problem for the atheist who maintains that the universe, and therefore existence, is not to be considered a being in any sense, not rational, alive, nor possessing thoughts. The problem of evil is not solved in such a position, it is dissolved; for the notion of evil evaporates along with the notion of goodness, and with all other human terms or terms of being (at least in a fundamental sense; relativism may pretend to drink from the water of the hallucinated mirage in its desert of a universe, but such is only word play, I mean to deal in the notion of fundamental truth even if it is only at last to reject it and accept the relativist world of competing delusions.) Of course a main problem with relativism is that it is dishonest, it pretends to reject eternal truths but its proponents, if they were physicians, would still prescribe antipsychotics to patients who had a persecution complex. Now the honest relativist could not do this on his conscience, for his philosophy must inform him that his patient is as right and justified as he in his delusions, for ultimately neither is justified. Yet even in this there would be an insupportable conviction (refutation is certainty), the only issue of honest relativism can be loss of bearings, as forward is north to the north-facing and south to the south-facing.

   Equally it is quite proper that the theist or the logician should say that the atheist must grapple with the problem of good. 'If God exists why do we die?' 'Well, if God does not exist why do we live?' Admittedly it is an easier problem for the complete atheist, for he must also be the complete relativist. 'We do not live, we only think we do.' As Richard Dawkins still maintains (though never with as convincing an air as when he plays the destroyer) that human beings have purpose because they 'make' purpose, so human beings live because they 'make' life, they 'make' goodness, they even 'make' evil; they 'make' truth, they 'make' certainty, they 'make' doubt. Therefore Mr. Dawkins can say he is a 'cultural' Anglican (quite like most Anglican clergy to-day, that is to say, not an Anglican at all), and that he 'makes' his moral judgements. Maybe he puts a spin of utilitarianism on them; things are good because they are beneficial etcetera. He and his 'horsemen' argue against all the worst expressed arguments of theism and get away with it, leaving an impression of having defeated that philosophy when they have not even begun to approach it. In such a way might a fool disprove the roundness of the earth by knowing only flawed science. I speak sincerely, I have watched many of their debates and it is clear they have never even attempted to understand even a page of the philosophy with which, they are under the apprehension, they contend.

   All of this of course seems very ingenious, but so does a lot of foolery seem; as the funniest people are people who do not think they are funny, so the most idiotic people are those who do not think they are idiotic. Reductionism is idiotic and there is no escaping from it. Relativism is really only a second tier to reductionism itself; it says there are no absolutes, certainly no world of ideas, only what is functional and regular in this life, such as we admit to and trust. This they pretend is enough, and they carry on in their lives the same as everyone else, making the same mistakes, pursuing the same appetites, never really believing their world-shattering theory except in debates of terminological acrobatics.

   Now aside from the fact that the existence of God identical with goodness (or rather not identical but higher even, and goodness but a reflected ray) makes for a very good motive in justifying human ethics, human reason, human love, human being (and this indeed quite good enough a cause for faith in any man, certainly in the practical man) as showing these things to be actual because fundamental. We are as we are because of God says theism, like as the little branch is as its tree in miniature; 'no, no,' says atheism, or relativism, or reductionism, 'we are as we are because we are as we are, that is all'. 'Truth is anything which is the case' saith Wittgenstein, in other words, truth is fabrication. We know not why, indeed there is no knowing why, never mind the why and wherefore, we are dust and ash and therefore, though hopefully we stare at stars, we lie upon the gutter floor.

   So the existence of good is not so much a problem for atheism, because in atheism both good and ill are fundamentally strange to the overall setting which is, simply put, barreness and mineral, objects and not subjects, doings and not beings.

   Good in the universe of the atheist is as real as Oliver Twist, the notion of it stirs vivid emotions in people, but it is merely that, an imaginary pinpoint of feelings. The same is true of evil, though outrage tends to work more energy than pleasure, so people tend to be more voluble about what is wrong than what is right, nevertheless, 't is dancing mineral all the same. We can argue all we like, and we will, but that does not make us anything different from the chalk in the cliffs, so says science, so says atheism. 'O but we are a different configuration of particles!' and what, pray, has configuration to do with the matter? I speak of what we are (or what it is said we are) not what we are configured as.

   In pantheism these problems do not arise as it is not the mineral and not the degradation which defines the universe but the being. The universe is more like to a man than to a lead pencil in pantheism. This means that all our thoughts and emotions do have reality, a greater reality in fact than the granite which so painfully stubs our toes, because they reveal more about the nature of being, and so the nature of the universe, and so the nature of God. Yet the Yorkshire Ripper existed and so God is a blackguard; yet maggots exist and so God is disgusting; yet all this imperfection exists and so God does not exist (if He is meant to be perfect), or if it so happens He does exist He is imperfect and therefore in what sense is He, She, It, They, Them, and That, God?

   God because infinite, God because eternal, God because omniscient, and therefore inscrutable. It is not odd that difficulties exist in fathoming God. When we cannot even come to the end of pi how are we to rationalise God? We cannot, and yet we cannot but try, we must try, we will try, we will begin to rationalise Him with trust and not yield to reductionist relativism which is nothing other than moral, intellectual, and emotional, Surrender. As for the degradation of God, I have answered the question before, but unlike Spinoza I think it profitable to try and dilate on things as much as possible so that the minds of men can be fully inured to the thoughts of eternal truth. His work is pure gold, my work is gold leaf, but a single ounce of gold will cover one hundred and seventy square feet in gold leaf. I mine a little of his ingots and decorate my plaster casts.

   Degradation is an emotional term it is true, but this is not fully the answer. None will deny that Michaelangelo, though unkempt and unshaven with fingernails as long as Edward Scissorhands', represented more of existence than a tapioca pudding. So tapioca pudding proves the universe considered as a whole is capable of degradation. If we wish to take it further we may watch this excellent but depressing video talking about the nature of death and of entropy:

 

   He talks of the inevitability of equilibrium and the ice death of the universe, or some such other dirge of science, but I say, that which we call the universe reaching equilibrium is about as significant, in the infinite scale of God, as one man's Newton Cradle ceasing to tap. We quantify only with numbers and guess work, and though mathematics are highly useful they surely represent the most paradoxical, problematic, and fallible, study in all of human reasoning. (Divide ten by three.) On the one hand, all of this pessimism and thought of decay can be altered with a little perspective. For instance, old St. Peter's Basilica in Rome was degraded in the sixteenth century to rubble. A great and ancient precinct was destroyed utterly by the capacity in God's universe for degradation. There followed however the construction of the new St. Peter's Basilica.

   Thus perspective can radically shift the notion of degradation. This earth, this solar system, this galaxy, this region of God's infinite existence which we call the observable universe, may all implode, freeze, die, terminate, and out of it come a new St. Peter's Basilica. We must not think that we are necessarily correct when we think we see retrogression or deterioration; it may be but a construction phase for the even greater. Yet supposing that we do certainly see a degradation by our goodly lights, for example, heaven forfend it for a time at least, suppose that I should develop a terminal illness. No one, save my enemies if I have them, will be glad of the fact, and all will agree that the ensuing deterioration would be a degradation of me. Yet could I reasonably see in this a degradation of God? In what sense is the universe itself degraded by alteration in one of its parts? There is nothing so purposeful in my existence as that God may not carry on without me, although certainly (whether intellectually I admit it or not) I could not carry on without God, incarnate of all things, my Origin and my Termination. See the matter indeed as a puzzle and me as a puzzle piece. God is the puzzle entirely but he has the power to repaint the picture. So we change, and we think this change decay, and begin to doubt immediately as we begin to doubt ourselves. Yet our doubt matters not to Him, only to us. We can choose to believe in the perfection of God or not; that will not alter His perfection. If we know what is good for us we will choose to believe in God, to love Jesus Christ, and justify our goodly civilisation both rationally and emotionally by these means. Or we may choose not to. It is nothing to Him either way. What would it mean to Achilles if one of his hairs fell out?

   Or maybe I am completely wrong in all I say and represent. I'm going to shut up.

 

   Although I will add that to no thing can the name and concept of perfection be applied except to everything entire, for nothing therein is lacking. So that when it comes to appreciating the overall emergent unit of God, being greater than the sum of His parts, the analogy with Achilles' hair may be better understood. Others pray for a miracle as though that alone can validate their faith, as though a sudden cure, a light show, a thunderous voice, or a party trick, will confirm the existence of God better than existence itself. 'These little things are great to little man.' Indeed, judging a part for the whole, the notion of degradation may persist, and the feeling of pessimism will pervade, but this is merely short sightedness. One cannot see all of Monet's Reflections of Clouds on the Water-Lily Pond in one glance, but the legs, skull, and eyes, must wander for hours to piece together all the different parts, and only afterwards can the mind abstract these limited pieces of limited perception into a single memorised and beloved vision.